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Many (Verfassungs-)blog posts on China, be it on tweets, white papers, or the Social
Credit System, criticize legal institutions and realities by highlighting their difference
from “Western” or constitutionalist (####) traditions. This makes it rather easy for the
explicitly anti-Western and anti-constitutionalist official Chinese system of thought,
Sino-Marxism, to reject any criticism – either as Eurocentric, (legal) Orientalist,
and “culturally hegemonic” or as ignorant of “theoretical basis” of the Chinese
system. Therefore, legal scholars should always be aware of the two fundamental
differences, which Sino-Marxism is both a product of and again produces: the
one on the “deep level”, of ideologies underlying the law, and on the “meta level”,
of methods employed to analyze and compare the law. Knowing Sino-Marxism,
which provides powerful political but only limited analytical tools, is thus crucial for
transnational and global constitutionalists in order to defend their values without
being accused of a lack of understanding – also in the current case of Hong Kong.
Sino-Marxism (##(#)#####) and Xi Jinping Thought
Sino-Marxism is officially described as the “sinicized and modernized” version of
Marxism or “Marxism with Chinese characteristics”. In this (significantly) modified
form, Marxism is still authoritative for both Chinese state organs and the CCP – that
is, legislators, judges, public administrators, armed forces, state-owned enterprises
etc. as well as all party members. They “must take Marxism as their guide to
action”, because “its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality”. Also,
China’s population and academia (scholars being always part of the population,
often employed in state institutions, and not seldom party members) are required
to adhere to this “guiding ideology”, as “it has been perfectly right for history and
the people to choose Marxism”. Therefore, Sino-Marxism is not limited to Marxist
jurisprudence (########) and Marxist comparative law with Chinese characteristics
(############). Rather, it yields far-reaching implications for both Chinese positive
law and legal studies, be it inner-state or comparative.
Despite claiming to be anti-constitutionalist – and thus perhaps better described as
authoritarian constitutionalism –, Sino-Marxism has canonized its “leading maxims”
and major principles both in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) Constitution
and the Chinese Communist Party’s ( “CCP”) Statute. The enumerated maxims
are Marxism-Leninism (#######), Mao Zedong Thought (#####), Deng Xiaoping
Theory (#####), the “Important Thought of Three Represents” (“####”####), and the
“Scientific Outlook on Development” (#####).
Latest in the row is Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era (################), included in the CCP Statute in 2017 and
the PRC Constitutionin 2018. The increasingly aggressive regulations under Xi
are described with the most harmonious topoi: twelve “socialist core values”, a
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“four-pronged comprehensive strategy” and one “China Dream”, leading to the
“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. It may be debated to which extent
this constitutes a continuance of current ideology and praxis, a return to former,
especially Maoist, principles or a qualitatively “new era” featuring a “new normality”,
as stated in the official discourse. Yet, it is undisputed that current developments
cannot be grasped by taking these topoi at face value, but rather by identifying Sino-
Marxism’s four basic implications that also Xi Jinping Thought (and deed) rely on:
Law and practice (##)
First, Sino-Marxism conceptualizes law and theory as subordinate to practice.
Making law, as any other activity of the state or the party, must “seek truth from
facts” (####) and act according to “practical necessities”. These claims refer to base-
superstructure-theory, the core element of (historical) materialism. As part of the
superstructure, positive law is “dependent upon” the practical base – as are legal
studies.
Therefore, such legal pragmatism can also be found in methodology: Inner-state
jurisprudence employs analytical techniques like “theory building and testing
according to practice”, and comparative law “transfers foreign experiences” in order
to generate legal reforms.
Law and actuality (## or ##)
Secondly, this practice that law must abide by is the “actual” one. Actuality has a
factual and temporal dimension, designating the “reality” at a certain time. It thus
combines the base-superstructure model with dialectics to dialectical materialism
emphasizing the dynamics and contradictions between base and superstructure. Its
so-called “sinicized” version is Mao Zedong’s theory of contradictions (####) aiming
to identify the primary and secondary, internal and external contradictions in society
– and to solve them.
Methodologically, legal analyses (or: comparisons) therefore start from the
contradictions and current “reality” in Chinese society (or: the societies compared)
and explain Chinese law (or: compare the respective legal orders) on that basis. This
reveals interesting similarities to, and might be additionally explained with, American-
inspired legal realism, since many conservative – in China: “leftist” – legal scholars
have been educated in the United States. For Sino-Marxists, the practical base thus
serves as the analytical basis of legal studies, and not merely as their additionally
considered legal “context”.
Actuality is praised for giving rise to significant ideological flexibility, because
contradictions and practical necessities (may) constantly change. However, actuality
as a “general clause” is devoid of content and exclusively defined and changed
by the CCP: Therefore, in 1978/81, party leaders could, with a wave of the hand,
declare “economic backwardness” as the most pressing contradiction and economic
development as the highest goal of Chinese politics and law. The economic
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instrument created in the reform and opening-up era (####) are thus regarded as
a “socialist market economy” and, prima vista paradoxical, as a consequence of
Marxism.
Example: Actuality and contradictions in current
Hong Kong
The theory of contradictions is also revealing in the current case of Hong Kong.
Having “returned” (####) in 1997, Hong Kong as a “special administrative
region” (HKSAR) forms part of the PRC territory. This territorial integrity will, at
(almost) any price, be upheld as China’s “core interest” (####). For this purpose,
however, Sino-Marxism considers it necessary to solve alleged contradictions
around Hong Kong:
First, the internal contradictions in Hong Kong society are supposedly rooted
in British colonial rule. Sino-Marxism identifies primary contradictions between
“labour and capital” and between “the rise in demands of the urban population
and the decline in governance abilities of the HKSAR government”, or secondary
contradictions in terms of housing etc. Then, the external contradictions between
Hong Kong, especially its courts (seen as a British heritage), and the central level
in Beijing. Both the mode of definition of contradictions and their qualification as
internal or external might be questioned from an intra-Marxist perspective. However,
they have led Sino-Marxists to argue that “one country, two systems” (####) could
never be a long-term solution – but rather a contradiction to be solved. Moreover,
Sino-Marxists consider Hong Kong as part of the main contradiction of the whole
Chinese society, redefined under Xi Jinping in 2017 as the PRC’s inter-locally
“unbalanced and inadequate development”. This explains why state and party
leaders are not any more interested in maintaining Hong Kong’s “unbalanced”,
outstanding status towards the Mainland – be it as a hub for finance and business or
for (respective) personal freedoms and self-administration.
These “theoretical fundaments” suggest that Chinese state and party leaders might
concede single points to Hong Kong protesters, e.g. by withdrawing the extradition
bill or by not cancelling district elections, but will hardly give in to their final aims. This
is because the latter, though probably equally suitable to solve alleged contradictions
surrounding Hong Kong, point in a direction opposite to the “eschatology” outlined in
the CCP statute and PRC constitution.
Law and politics (##)
Another reason for this prognosis is, thirdly, Sino-Marxism’s integrated “politics and
law” concept (##). Politics is used synonymous with the political rule by the CCP,
claiming that there can only exist one ruling party (###). And because of the principle
(de constitutione lata) that this party shall lead the people, state, and legislation (###
#), politics is considered superior to law and legal studies.
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Methodologically, this is supported by political legal studies (####), politico-legal
legal studies (####), and political constitutional studies (#####) developed by Chen
Duanhong. The latter, although translated as political constitutionalism, in an again
anti-constitutionalist manner only treats contents set by the CCP as the substantial
and “real” constitution of the PRC – be it the CPC statute, other political documents
(####) and party norms (#### or ####), or the principle of party leadership itself.
Anti-normative normativity (###)
Fourthly and as a consequence, Sino-Marxists – as many others – openly reject
formalism, idealism, and liberal legalism. But they still claim to adopt a kind of
normativism – which they, however, demand to “emanate from political realism”,
“repel abstract and void idealism”, and “be born out of political power”. As a result,
Sino-Marxist normativity does not describe the specific existence of law in the sphere
of “ought”, (analytically) separated from the world of “is”, let alone the “intrinsic value”
and “immanent force” of the law. Rather, it cumulates in a factualistic positivism
of power that is challenged by various “schools” of (legal) studies, but for different
reasons:
Liberal scholars in China and the West contest its foundation – rejecting the
autonomy of law and legal studies – by defending normativistic legal positivism
and (liberal) constitutionalism. Critical scholars question its justification – supposed
“Chinese characteristics” (####) – as sinocentric, self-Orientalist, and essentialist
(inverting the Sino-Marxist allegations against “Western” or constitutionalist
scholarship). And Marxist scholars object its conclusions – subordinating law and
science to practice, actuality, politics, and anti-normative normativity – from an
“internal” standpoint: Firstly, because these conclusions are not only “far from
orthodox Marxist dogmatism”, but also from radical democratic readings of Marx
and Engels. Secondly, because they ignore the differences between base and
superstructure, the distinctions inside superstructure, and the dialectics between
them.
In a nutshell: Sino-Marxism might provide Chinese state and party leaders with
powerful political tools. Their analytical strength, in contrast, is rather limited.
Therefore, legal scholars should elucidate instead of simply elide, but, at the same
time, deconstruct instead of simply replicate Sino-Marxism – as is the case with all
other ideologies (####).
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